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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been twenty years since Professor (now United States District
Judge) Robert E. Keeton identified a number of cases interpreting insurance
contracts that, in his opinion, deserved to be recognized as delineating new prin-
ciples of insurance law. In his now famous two-part article' examining rights of
policyholders and other claimants, he argued that it was very difficult to recon-
cile a significant number of the cases with the orthodox doctrines-such as con-
struing ambiguities, waiver, estoppel, election, reformation and rescis-
sion-which previously had evolved in recognition of rights at variance with
contract provisions generally.2 Recognition of two broad principles, he submit-
ted, would explain most of what otherwise appeared to be an undue number of
aberrational insurance decisions. He stated the principles as follows: (1) an in-
surer will be denied any unconscionable advantage in an insurance transaction,
and (2) the reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries will
be honored.3
The second principle-the one receiving the most attention and the one
upon which this article will focus-has come to be known as the "doctrine" of
reasonable expectations." In one formulation or another, it has been embraced
by a number of jurisdictions in the last two decades.5 In the process, it has
become the subject of considerable comment in the legal literature. Some com-
mentators have applauded this development in insurance law,6 whereas it has
been greeted with stern criticism in other quarters.1 Still others, generally
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona, College of Law. B.B.A., University of Texas, 1960; LL.B., Uni-
versity of Texas, 1965; LL.M., Harvard University, 1969.
1. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights At Variance With Policy Provisions: Part One, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 961
(1970) (hereinafter Keeton, Rights At Variance). See also Keeton, Insurance Law Rights At Variance With
Policy Provisions: Part Two, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1970).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., R.H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25D (1987).
5. As many as sixteen states may be viewed as having adopted the doctrine, but it is not clear whether every
court intended to embrace the broadest formulation. The particular cases are analyzed and discussed later. See
Infra notes 22-67 and accompanying text.
6. Cohen, Flight Insurance: Conforming to the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 30 FED. INS. CouNs.
Q. 19 (1979); Kamarck, Opening the Gate: The Steven Case and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 29
HASTINGS LJ. 153 (1977); Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275 (1976); Kee-
ton, Honoring Reasonable Expectations in the Interpretation of Life and Health Insurance Contracts, 1971
A.B.A. SEC. INS, NEOL & Corm. L. PROCEDINGS 213; Comment, Insurer Liability in the Asbestos Disease
Context-Application of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 27 S.D.L. REv. 239 (1982); Note, Interpreting
the "Business Pursuits" Exclusion in Homeowner's Policies-Toward Honoring "Reasonable Expectations," 25
S.D.L. REV. 132 (1980).
7. Anderson, Reasonable Expectations and Insurance Contracts: What Should We Reasonably Expect from
Judges, 28 FOR THE DaFENSE 9 (April 1986); Anderson, Life Insurance Conditional Receipts and Judicial Inter-
vention, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 593 (1980); Birnbaum, Stahl & West, Standardized Agreements and the Parol Evi-
dence Rule: Defining and Applying the Expectations Principle, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 793 (1984); Gardner, Reasona-
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favorable in their appraisals, have noted that the cases applying the principle
provided little guidance in the way of doctrinal content and have offered con-
structive suggestions to eliminate what they view as deficiencies., Nevertheless,
even after two decades, there still seems to exist a great deal of uncertainty as
to the doctrinal content and when the principle may be invoked, including most
of the jurisdictions that have professed to have adopted it. In short, questions
remain as to whether the principle has developed into a full-fledged doctrine
which can be applied in a predictable and evenhanded manner by the courts.
ble Expectations: Evolution Completed or Revolution Begun?, 1978 INs. LJ. 573; Kelso, Idaho and the Doctrine
of Reasonable Expectations: A Springboard for an Analysis of a New Approach to a Valuable But Often Misun-
derstood Doctrine, 47 INS. CouNs. J. 325 (1980); Kimball, Book Review, 19 CoNN. L REv. 311 (1987) (reviewing
K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUIUC POLICY (1986)); Squires, A Skepti-
cal Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM 252 (1971); Comment, A Critique of the Reason-
able Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1461 (1989); Comment, Reasonable Expectations: Contract Am-
biguity v. Arbitrary Application, 34 DRAKE L. REv. 1065 (1985-86); Comment, The Reconstruction of Insurance
Contracts Under the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 18 J. MARSHALL L. Rav. 155 (1984); Comment, A
Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as Applied to Insurance Contracts, 13 U.
MicIm J.L. REt. 603 (1980); Comment, Insurance Law-Insurance Contract Interpretation: The Doctrine of Rea-
sonable Expectations Has No Place in Illinois, 1985 S. ILL U.LJ. 687; Note, Reasonable Expectations: The
Insurer's Dilemma, 24 DRAKE L. Rev. 853 (1975); Note, Reasonable Expectations and Bad Faith in the Settle-
ment of a Health Insurance Claim, 19 FORUM 340 (1983/84); Note, Reasonable Expectations Approach to
Insurance Contract Interpretation Modified in Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REv. 577 (1982); Note, The Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in Massachusetts and New Hampshire: A Comparative Analysis, 17 NEw ENG. L. R v.
891 (1982); Note, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of
Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1175 (1982); Note, The Role of Public Policy and Reasonable Expecta-
tions In Construing Insurance Contracts, 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 748 (1974).
8. See, e.g., Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expecta-
tions of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151 (1981); Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a Principled
Application, 13 PIEPERDINE L. Rev. 267 (1986); Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L.
REv. 323 (1986); Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract, 21 TRIAL 27 (Dec. 1985).
For other works discussing the doctrine of reasonable expectation or cases applying it, see Boyle, The Reason-
able Expectations Doctrine in Massachusetts Insurance Law, 32 BOSTON BJ. 16 (Mar./Apr. 1988); Clarke, The
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured-in England?, 1989 J. Bus. L. 389 (Sept.); Gottsfield, Darner/Gordinier:
The Darling of the Non-Drafting Party's Nursery, 25 ARIz. ATT'Y 35 (Oct. 1988); Leitner, Enforcing the Con-
sumer's "Reasonable Expectations" in Interpreting Insurance Contracts: A Doctrihe in Search of Coherent Defi-
nition, 38 FEDN INS. & CORP. CouNs. Q. 379 (1987/88); Ostrager & Ichel, Should the Business Insurance
Policy Be Construed Against the Insurer? Another Look at the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 33 FEEDN INS.
CouNs. Q. 273 (1983); Perlet, The Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM
116 (1971); Plitt, When Is A Standardized Contract Binding?, 23 ARuz. BJ. 30 (Feb./Mar. 1988); Young, Lewis
& Lee, Insurance Contract Interpretation: Issues and Trends, 1975 INs. LJ. 71 (Feb. 1975); Comment, Decapita-
tion to Cure Dandruff? The Scope of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine of Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 20 ARz. ST. LJ. 841 (1988); Comment, Insurance-Contracts-The Ambiguity
in the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 62 N.D.L. REv. 423 (1986); Comment, Great Expectations for the
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. Rev. 371 (1986); Note, Insurance Law-Challenging
Boilerplate Exclusions-Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 1984 ARz. ST. LJ. 751;
Note, Cochran Revisited: The Reasonable Expectations of the Insured and the Visible Marks of Forcible Entry
Liability Limitation, 18 CREIGHOrON L. Rev. 389 (1985); Note, Insurance Law: The Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 741 (1987-88); Note, Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Accident Insurance Co., 12
IDAHO L. Rev. 97 (1975); Note, Insurance-Contract and Policy--The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations
Applied to Void a Crop Spraying Exclusion, 53 N.D.L. Rav. 613 (1977); Recent Development: Con-
tracts-Insurance Lawi-Theories of Unconscionability, Reasonable Expectations and Implied Warranty Defeat
Policy Clause Limiting Recovery to Burglary Evidenced by Exterior Marks. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied
Mutual Insurance Co., 64 Geo. Li. 987 (1976).
See also Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1174 (1983); Slaw-
son, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. Rev. 529 (1971);
Comment, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 CoLu. L Rev.
1849 (1988).
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS IN INSURANCE LAW
The purpose of this article is to dispel doubts concerning the doctrinal sta-
tus of the principle by demonstrating that its jurisprudential core does consist of
rules that provide sufficient guidelines for its application. In doing so, the article
will briefly review the origins of and the inherent problems with the reasonable
expectations principle, inventory the jurisdictions that have and have not em-
braced it, and identify and examine the important doctrinal developments over
the last twenty years.
II. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE DOCTRINE
The emergence of the principle that courts will honor the reasonable expec-
tations of policyholders and intended beneficiaries, and even applicants for in-
surance, is clear enough when viewed from today's vantage, but in 1970 its
recognition depended on an unusual ability to analyze the cross-currents and to
identify underlying relationships between cases of different fact patterns. Analy-
sis of cases involving such disparate matters as the marketing of air-travel trip
insurance, life insurance, and casualty insurance; the limits to which an insurer
may restrict the meaning of "accidental bodily injuries;" and the extent of lia-
bility coverage under a homeowners policy led Professor Keeton to posit what
he viewed as a new principle.9 He stated the principle in the following way:
The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking
study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations."0
Relation of these seemingly unrelated cases under the theoretical arch of rea-
sonable expectations was a masterstroke indeed. The relation lent a legitimacy
to the opinions that was otherwise lacking because it provided a common ration-
ale that went a long way toward refuting the notion that the opinions were the
product of unprincipled prejudice against insurers. Nevertheless, Professor Kee-
ton did not assert that the proposed principle offered a complete explanation.
Professor Keeton recognized at the outset that, as stated, this principle was
too general to serve as a guide from which particularized decisions could be
derived through an exercise of logic, and too broad to be universally true.'"
Nevertheless, he submitted that the principle accurately identified the direction
in which insurance law was and should be moving.'" He recognized that it may
take time for the common law process to work out the exact doctrinal dimen-
sions of any new principle. In 1976, six years after his original article, Professor
Keeton discussed the distinctions between the recognition of a principle and the
development of its doctrinal aspects:
Principles collide in a sense beyond doctrinal conflict. Doctrines are sets of ex-
plicit rules of decision-the outcomes of accommodation among competing principles.
Conflicts among doctrines are imperfections yet to be worked out as the operational
rules of the legal system evolve. The collision of principles, on the other hand, is a
9. Keeton, Rights At Variance, supra note 1, at 966-74.
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phenomenon that does not signal imperfection of the legal system but rather signals
the underlying conffict of interests with which the legal system must grapple.
A principle is a generalization so broad that it does not express all the qualifica-
tions and limitations that must be expressed in an accurate statement of a rule, or a
set of rules of decision that constitute at least the framework, though not the full body,
of a doctrine. The qualifications and limitations arise because of the collision of under-
lying principles. In short, a principle, as Professor Austin Scott has observed, is a
proposition that is not true, exactly.1
Of course, the number and frequency of opportunities for a court of last resort
to work out the doctrinal aspects of any new principle are, in many ways, quite
fortuitous. Unlike the legislative process where a legal problem may be studied
in its entirety and a complete solution formulated, the courts are most often
required to follow a piecemeal approach. Thus has it been with the origin and
doctrinal development of the principle of reasonable expectations. At any par-
ticular point in this process, it has not been all that clear where the boundaries
lay. Only with the benefit of several decades of experience is it now possible to
discern where the courts have been and where they are today.
As mentioned at the outset, one of the purposes of this article is to explore
just how far the law has moved and in what directions. Has the principle of
reasonable expectations been embraced widely and, if so, by whom? Has the
principle been applied in such a way that one can discern rules from which
particularized decisions can be derived through an exercise of logic? Have rules
been articulated in such a way that one can intelligently predict the legal reso-
lution of future disputes to which the rules apply? In other words, has a suffi-
cient jurisprudential corpus developed regarding the reasonable expectations
principle so that one can justify referring to this body of law as the doctrine of
reasonable expectations? It is submitted that all these questions can now be
answered in the affirmative.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE SUBSTANTIVE NATURE OF THE DOCTRINE
Identification of any doctrine may be facilitated by recognizing what is not
essential for its invocation. Such recognition is particularly helpful here because
there has been a tendency to confuse the substantive nature of the doctrine with
a canon of construction. There are courts that employ the "reasonable expecta-
tions of an insured" as a test for resolving ambiguities in insurance policies.1 4
This test, whether phrased in these words or otherwise, 15 is designed to give the
insured the benefit of the doubt where the language of an insurance policy rea-
sonably may be interpreted in more than one way. Such a canon of construction
13. Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275, 277 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985); Gowing v. Great Plains
Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Kan. 78, 82, 483 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1971); Woodson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 743
S.W.2d 835, 839 (Ky. 1987).
15. See, e.g., Baybutt Const. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914, 921 (Me. 1983) C"...
policy should be viewed from standpoint of the average ordinary person who is untrained in either the law or the
insurance field... "), rev'd on other grounds, Peerless Ins. Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383 (Me. 1989); Brown v.
City of Laconia, 118 N.H. 376, 378, 386 A.2d 1276, 1277 (1978) (policy interpreted from standpoint of the
average layman).
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may well fall within a general concept of honoring reasonable expectations, but
the presence of an ambiguity is not essential to invocation of the principle ar-
ticulated by Professor Keeton.'" In fact, decisions using this test solely to con-
strue policy language do not support a new principle at all, but fall within the
time-honored canon of construing ambiguities against the drafter of the con-
tract-contra proferentem.'7
To the contrary, the doctrine of reasonable expectations, if it involves a
new principle at all, may apply without regard to any ambiguity. a' It may affect
the substantive provisions of the policy, regardless of how the policy is drafted.'9
Consequently, when a court states that it is employing a test involving the "rea-
sonable expectations of the insured" to deal with ambiguous language and does
not explain whether the test is limited to construction of ambiguous terms or
may also be applied even where there is no ambiguity, great uncertainty may be
created. Moreover, where a court's opinion may be viewed as holding that the
test involving the reasonable expectations of the insured is only a rule of con-
struction, the application of which is limited to cases involving ambiguities
2 0
great confusion may result. There should now be no doubt that the principle of
reasonable expectations, as identified and articulated by Professor Keeton, is not
merely a rule of construction and may be applied even where there is no
ambiguity.2'
IV. INVENTORY OF THE JURISDICTIONS
A. Jurisdictions That Have Adopted the Doctrine
Once the doctrine of reasonable expectations has been properly defined as
one that can be applied to the substantive provisions of insurance policies as
well as to the construction of ambiguous language, then one may begin to deter-
mine the extent to which the new principle has actually been embraced. One
16. Keeton, Honoring Reasonable Expectations in the Interpretation of Life and Health Insurance Con-
tracts, supra note 6, at 216.
17. "Where words or other manifestations of intention bear more than one reasonable meaning an interpreta-
tion is preferred which operates more strongly against the party from whom they proceed, unless their use by him
is prescribed by law." RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS § 236(d) (1932). See Comment, Insurance as Contract: The
Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, supra note 8.
18. Even though a policy may be complicated or intricately arranged does not mean it is ambiguous. It may
be confusing to or beyond the comprehension of many consumers because of its wording or design, but completely
intelligible to more sophisticated or discerning readers. The doctrine of reasonable expectations may apply to this
situation as well as to situations where the policy is a model of clarity. Nevertheless, although confusion or unin-
telligibility may play a role under the doctrine, it is not a sine qua non for applying it. See Keeton, Rights At
Variance, supra note 1, at 968.
19. Keeton, Honoring Reasonable Expectations in the Interpretation of Life and Health Insurance Con-
tracts, supra note 6, at 217.
20. See, e.g., Simon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1987); Woodson v. Manhattan Life Ins.
Co. of N.Y., 743 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Ky. 1987); Walle Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 419 N.W.2d 176, 181 at n.4
(N.D. 1988); Keenan v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co., 108 Wash. 2d 314, 738 P.2d 270 (1987); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County School Dist. 1, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988).
21. For courts that have so ruled, see, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Bussell, 498 P.2d 706, 710 (Alaska 1972);
Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 154 Ariz. 266, 272, 742 P.2d 277, 283 (1987); Rodman v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 905-06 (Iowa 1973); Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325, 336-39, 495 A.2d
406, 412-14 (1985).
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may identify some sixteen state courts of last resort that have, in one guise or
another, issued opinions that contain language stating that the doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations as defined by Professor Keeton has been adopted. At least
ten of these decisions make clear that the court understood the unique ramifica-
tions that truly make it a new development. Those opinions were rendered by
the highest courts of Alabama,2 2 Alaska,23  Arizona,24 California,25  Iowa, 26
Montana,2 7 Nebraska, 28 Nevada,29 New Hampshire, 0 and New Jersey.3' In ad-
22. Lambert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 260, 263 (Ala. 1976) (interpreting Other Insurance clause
in uninsured motorist coverage). See Smith v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 500 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. 1986) (interpreting
policy limits in underinsured motorist coverage).
23. Stewart-Smith Haidinger v. Avi-Truck, Inc., 682 P.2d 1108 (Alaska 1984) (construing airworthiness and
pilot rating certificate requirements in aircraft hull policy); Puritan Life Ins. Co. v. Guess, 598 P.2d 900 (Alaska
1979) (construing effect of conditional receipt in marketing life insurance); Stordahl v. Government Emp. Ins.
Co., 564 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1977) (construing meaning of "uninsured automobile" in uninsured motorist coverage);
INA Life Ins. Co. v. Brundin, 533 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1975) (construing accidental death policy); Continental Ins.
Co. v. Bussell, 498 P.2d 706 (Alaska 1972) (construing contractual liability policy); National Indem. Co. v.
Flesher, 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970) (construing duty to defend under auto liability policy).
24. Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 154 Ariz. 266, 272, 742 P.2d 277, 283 (1987) (construing "resident
of same household" clause in uninsured motorist coverage); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bogart, 149 Ariz.
145, 717 P.2d 449 (1986) (construing Other Insurance clause in nonowned auto coverage in auto liability policy);
Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388 (1984) (resolving
dispute over limits of liability coverage for lessees of insured's autos); Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 133
Ariz. 139, 650 P.2d 441 (1982) (construing condition in fire policy that any action on a claim insured under the
policy must be brought within 12 months from inception of loss).
25. Smith v. Westiand Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649, 539 P.2d 433 (1975) (construing
effect of conditional receipt in marketing life insurance).
26. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981) (construing "ways immediately
adjoining" the insured's premises provision in farm liability policy); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,
227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (construing visible marks of entry provision in burglary policy); Rodman v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1973) (construing named insured exclusion under auto liability
policy).
27. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820 (1983) (alternate holding construing
household exclusion clause in auto liability policy).
28. Nile Valley Coop. Grain & Milling Co. v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 187 Neb. 720, 193 N.W.2d
752 (1972) (construing standard fire policy).
29. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 425 P.2d 346 (1967) (construing effect of conditional
receipt in marketing life insurance). See Sullivan v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 98 Nev. 364, 649 P.2d 1357 (1982)
(holding it would violate insured's reasonable expectations to enforce offset provision in medical payments provi-
sion where claimant had also recovered under liability coverage of same policy); Catania v. State Farm Life Ins.
Co., 95 Nov. 532, 598 P.2d 631 (1979) (refusing to enforce "accidental means" language in accidental death
policy citing INA Life Ins. Co. v. Brundin, 533 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1975), wherein the Alaska Supreme Court
explicitly adopted the reasonable expectations doctrine in its broad form).
30. Grimes v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 120 N.H. 718, 422 A.2d 1312 (1980) (deciding whether unin-
sured motorist benefits contained within a single policy that insured two cars may be "stacked"); Karol v. New
Hampshire Ins. Co., 120 N.H. 287, 414 A.2d 939 (1980) (deciding whether "all risk" policy covered damage to
film caused by insured during processing); Lariviere v. New Hampshire Ins. Group, 120 N.H. 168, 413 A.2d 309
(1980) (construing exclusion under general liability policy issued to cover insured in building-moving business that
would have eliminated coverage for injury "arising out of and occurring during the course of the movement of any
building) . . ."; Storms v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 118 N.H. 427, 388 A.2d 578 (1978) (construing
whether insurer had duty to defend insured where alleged negligence took place within policy period, but bodily
injury occurred after policy was cancelled); Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 116 N.H. 636, 365 A.2d
744 (1976) (construing completed operations exclusion in general liability policy); Magulas v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
114 N.H. 704, 327 A.2d 608 (1974) (construing amount of lessee-insured's loss under fire insurance policy for
damage to improvements and betterments to leased premises).
31. Werner Industries, Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 112 N.J. 30, 548 A.2d 188 (1988) (whether umbrella
policy "drops down" to provide coverage in the event of primary carrier's insolvency); Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co.,
100 N.J. 325, 495 A.2d 406 (1985) (construing "claims made" professional liability policy); Perrine v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 56 N.J. 120, 265 A.2d 521 (1970) (construing "accidental means" provision in accidental death
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dition, there may be as many as six other jurisdictions that deserve to be in-
cluded in this group. However, the decisions from these six jurisdictions are not
entirely free from ambiguity themselves and require analysis.
In the 1970s, Pennsylvania seemed well on its way to being one of the
earliest to recognize the new principle3 2 and subsequently was thought to be one
of the states clearly to have adopted it.33 Questions have been raised, however.
The uncertainty began with the case of Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co.3 4
In that case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was faced with the question of
whether a conditional receipt created a temporary contract of insurance where
its issuance was coupled with a premium payment by the applicant. It seemed
clear that the court, in resolving the question, recognized the principle of rea-
sonable expectations as applying. Not only did the court apply the principle, it
also required the insurer to shoulder a heightened burden of proof on this issue:
[I]f the language of the application and conditional receipt, when so read, indicates an
intent on the part of the insurer to provide interim insurance, then such benefits will
be awarded by the court. That, however, is not the end of the examination. In situa-
tions where the circumstances of the transaction do not indicate that the insurer in-
tended to provide interim insurance, but nevertheless show that the insurer accepted
payment of the first premium at the time it took the application, it is then up to the
insurer to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the consumer had no reason-
able basis for believing that he or she was purchasing immediate insurance coverage.385
Had the court stopped here, the confusion might never have arisen, but the
court went on. In support of this holding, the court also reiterated a prior posi-
tion that the adhesionary nature of insurance documents is such that the in-
sured is under no duty to read the policy sent by the company, indicating that
the same rule would apply to conditional receipts. 36 This somewhat gratuitous
statement became the basis for the subsequent confusion over the doctrine in
Pennsylvania.
policy); Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965) (construing effect of conditional
receipt in marketing life insurance); Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961)
(construing accident insurance policy).
32. Prior to 1970, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had held, albeit on the grounds that an ambiguity
existed, that the use of a conditional receipt in marketing life insurance, when coupled with an initial premium
payment, created a contract of insurance. McAvoy Vitrified Brick Co. v. North American Life Assurance Co.,
395 Pa. 75, 149 A.2d 42 (1959). The court relied on Ransom v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d
633 (1954) and Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
849 (1947). These were life insurance marketing cases which involved conditional receipts coupled with initial
premium payments and were one of the types of cases used by Professor Keeton to support his argument for
recognition of a new principle of honoring reasonable expectations. See Keeton, Rights At Variance, supra note 1,
at 969, 971. In Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 225 A.2d 532 (1967), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court also abandoned the distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental results," another type of case
which Professor Keeton relied on in reaching his conclusion. See Keeton, Rights At Variance, supra note 1, at
976.
33. See listing of adopting states in Davenport Peters Co. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 286, 291 at
fn.5 (1980) (opinion by Keeton, J.).
34. 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1978).
35. Id. at 594, 388 A.2d at 1353.
36. Id. at 589, 388 A.2d at 1351. A similar rule had been adopted at the superior court level: "[W]here a
policy is written in unambiguous terms, the burden of establishing the applicability of the exclusion or limitation
involves proof that the insured was aware of the exclusion or limitation and that the effect thereof was explained
to him." Hionis v. Northern Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Pa. Super. 511, 517, 327 A.2d 363, 365 (1974).
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Five years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, while construing exclu-
sions in a general liability policy in Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American
Empire Ins. Co.,3  rejected the argument that the insured could avoid the effect
of a clearly drafted exclusion by claiming that he or she did not know of or
understand the exclusion.3 8 The supreme court, however, went on to hold that
the manifest inequality of bargaining power between an insurance company and
a purchaser of insurance may justify a court's occasional deviation from the
plain language of the contract. In support of the latter proposition, the court
merely cited a Pennsylvania statute dealing with unconscionability.39 Reference
to Collister or the principle of reasonable expectations was conspicuously ab-
sent. Thus, one could construe Standard Venetian Blind as having greatly nar-
rowed Collister: where there was no ambiguity in the policy, the court was jus-
tified in ignoring the language in only one instance-where the terms were
unconscionable. This possibility did not go unnoticed. In a subsequent dissenting
opinion, one member of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court questioned whether
the doctrine of reasonable expectations had ever been adopted in Pennsylvania
and, if so, whether it had survived Standard Venetian Blind.0 This course of
events raised some serious questions regarding the status of the doctrine in
Pennsylvania, but there is more.
In 1987, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Tonkovic v. State Farm
Mutual Auto Ins. Co.,41 which involved an application for disability insurance.
The insurer, after its agent had accepted the application and premium payment,
unilaterally inserted into the policy an exclusion that significantly reduced the
coverage specifically sought by the applicant. The evidence showed that the ap-
plicant was never informed or otherwise made aware of the change in cover-
age.4 2 The court distinguished Standard Venetian Blind on the basis that there
". .. the insured received precisely the coverage that he requested but failed to
read the policy to discover clauses that are the usual incident of the coverage
applied for." 43 In Tonkovic, where the insured did not receive the coverage for
which he applied, the court reiterated the rule to which reference was made in
Collister: "The burden is not on the insured to read the policy to discover such
changes, or not read it at his peril." The court then noted that this holding
37. 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563 (1983).
38. Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Emprie Ins. Co., 503 Pa. at 307, 469 A.2d at 567 (1983) (the
court specifically rejected the rule announced in Hionis and by implication overruled the similar statement in
Collister).
39. Id. at 307, 469 A.2d at 567.
40. Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfr's Ass'n Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 420, 517 A.2d 910 (1986)
(Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen's dissent adopted the opinion of the trial court. The opinion of the trial
court, in raising the questions regarding the status of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, did not mention
Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1978).
This indicates that the court, and perhaps even the attorneys, did not consider it as having been adopted in
Pennsylvania. Apparently plaintiff's counsel only argued, according to the trial court, that the doctrine was "tac-
itly supported" by Sands v. Granite Mut. Ins. Co., 232 Pa. Super. 70, 331 A.2d 711 (1974). Gene & Harvey
Builders at 432-33, 517 A.2d at 916.
41. 513 Pa. 445, 521 A.2d 920 (1987).
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was in accord with its decision in Collister and quoted extensively from the
portion of that opinion that outlines the doctrine of reasonable expectations.45 In
particular, the court quoted the portion that explains that the doctrine is not
merely a rule for resolving ambiguities and that it applies to all types of insur-
ance documents, "whether they be applications, conditional receipts, riders, pol-
icies or whatever . . ,",4 In view of these cases, how should one classify
Pennsylvania?
Viewed conservatively, one could argue that the Pennsylvania decisions, at
most, adopt a rather narrow application of the doctrine, one that provides relief
only where in the application process the insured gets less than what was specif-
ically promised. As will be seen below, however, getting less than what one
reasonably thought one was getting is the essential element for triggering the
doctrine of honoring reasonable expectations. Given the presence of that ele-
ment, there appears to be no logical basis to limit application of the doctrine to
the kind of fact situations found in Collister and Tonkovic. Collister itself goes
beyond this limited notion to a degree in that the court in that case stated that
the doctrine applied to situations where the circumstances of the transaction do
not establish that the insurer intended to provide coverage.47 Thus, it could be
argued that the doctrine would apply in the broader way in Pennsylvania. Even
where the policy clearly restricts coverage, the doctrine will apply if the insurer
otherwise fosters expectations of coverage in the insured. In any event, it should
be clear that Pennsylvania has adopted the doctrine, even though the extent of
the application may not be clear, and for that reason it should be aligned with
the ten jurisdictions listed earlier as having more clearly embraced the doctrine.
Opinions from the highest courts of Hawaii, North Carolina and Rhode
Island also support the inclusion of these jurisdictions as among the states
adopting the doctrine. Like the Pennsylvania experience, their adoption may not
be completely free from doubt. For example, four decisions of the Supreme
Court of Hawaii approved the Keeton formulation, 48 but three of these have
held that the insured had no reasonable expectations under the facts of those
cases.49 This circumstance alone would not disqualify Hawaii from the list of
states that have adopted the doctrine as a rule of substantive law, but when the
findings of no reasonable expectations are coupled with the further circum-
stance that in some of the cases the quote from the Keeton formulation is
closely positioned with statements that ambiguities are to be construed against
45. Id. at 456-57, 521 A.2d at 925-26.
46. Id.
47. Colllster, 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1978). See supra note 34 and
35 and accompanying text.
48. Fortune v. Wong, 68 Haw. 1, 702 P.2d 299 (1985) (upholding the motor vehicle exclusion in homeowners
policy); Hurtig v. Tcrminix Wood Treating & Contracting Co., 67 Haw. 480, 692 P.2d 1153 (1984) (holding that
Exclusion (o) regarding "property damage to work performed" in comprehensive general liability policy did not
apply to damage to home which was caused by termites allegedly as a result of insured's failure to correctly
perform contract to inspect and treat for termites); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Brooks, 67 Haw. 285, 686 P.2d
23 (1984) (upholding intentional harm exclusion in auto liability policy); Sturla, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
67 Haw. 203, 684 P.2d 960 (1984) (upholding "business risk" exclusion in comprehensive general liability policy).
49. Fortune, 68 Haw. at 1,702 P.2d at 299; Hawaiian Ins., 67 Haw. at 285, 686 P.2d at 23; Sturla, 67 Haw.
at 203, 684 P.2d at 960.
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the insurer,50 one must admit the possibility that the Hawaii court views the
doctrine more as a rule of construction and may not embrace its broader, sub-
stantive application. This possibility moves closer to probability upon examina-
tion of the one case in which the court did indicate that the insured's right to
enforcement of his reasonable expectations would be violated if the insurer's
position were accepted. 1 This decision really turned more on an interpretation
of the policy language rather than on an outright refusal to honor an unambigu-
ous term that defeated reasonable expectations. On the other hand, in none of
the cases did the court actually say that the doctrine would only apply where
the contract language was ambiguous. Rather, the court appeared to be adopt-
ing the doctrine in its broadest sense when it cited the Keeton formulation. 2
Until a more definitive Hawaii opinion, therefore, there is reason to argue that
Hawaii should be counted "in" rather than "out" of the list of adopting states. 3
North Carolina and Rhode Island provide two more examples of jurisdic-
tions that may have adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations, although
the evidence of adoption is relatively weak. The Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina used a test involving the insured's reasonable expectations in overruling a
line of decisions in that state that had strictly enforced the requirement that
notice be given to a liability insurer of the insured's involvement in an accident
as soon as practicable.54 Although the court did not cite or use the exact Keeton
formulation, it was clear that the court was relieving the insured from having to
comply with an unambiguous term of the policy. The court held, in line with a
growing number of authorities,5 5 that an unexcused delay by the insured in giv-
ing notice will not result in a policy defense unless the insurer is materially
prejudiced. The Rhode Island Supreme Court also appeared to be using a test
of reasonable expectations in a similar way by explaining that uninsured motor-
ist coverages could be "stacked"56 where separate premiums for such were paid
50. See, e.g., Fortune, 68 Haw. at 10, 702 P.2d at 306.
51. Hurtig v. Terminix Wood Treating & Contracting Co., 67 Haw. at 481, 692 P.2d at 1154.
52. Even the dissent in Hurtig seems to recognize the broader implications of the doctrine. Id. at 485, 692
P.2d at 1156.
53. In addition to the cases cited above, in 1969 the Supreme Court of Hawaii recognized that a conditional
receipt, when coupled with an initial premium payment, created a temporary contract of life insurance in Law v.
Hawaiian Life Ins. Co., 51 Haw. 288, 459 P.2d 195 (1969). In reaching this result, the court ignored the plain
language of the receipt that required that the applicant be a "risk acceptable in the judgment of the Company
under its rules, limits and standards for the plan and amount applied for at the rate of premium paid with the
application." Id. at 291, 459 P.2d at 197. In fact, the applicant did not meet these requirements. Id. In doing so
the court cited Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849
(1947), one of the main cases relied on by Professor Keeton in recognizing the new principle. See Keeton, Rights
At Variance, supra note 1, at 969.
54. Great American Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 279 S.E.2d 769 (N.C. 1981) rev'd on other grounds,
Great American Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 315 N.C. 714, 340 S.E.2d 743 (1985) (holding unexcused but
good faith delay by insured in giving notice to insurer of an accident does not relieve the insurer of its obligation
to defend and indemnify unless the delay operates materially to prejudice the insurer's ability to investigate and
defend, and that insurer had the burden to prove prejudice).
55. See Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Requiring Liability Insurer to Show Prejudice to Escape Lia-
bility Because of Insured's Failure or Delay in Giving Notice of Accident or Claim, or in Forwarding Suit
Papers, 32 A.L.R. 4th 141 (1984).
56. The term "stacking" is commonly used to describe the situation where a claimant seeks to avoid the
effect of Other Insurance clauses in uninsured motorist coverages by aggregating coverages in an attempt to
secure complete indemnification. See RE. KEurON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 3.11(f)(2) (1988).
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on two cars covered under the same policy.57 The effect of these opinions sup-
ports the proposition that both states have adopted the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, but the lack of an explicit adoption makes for some uncertainty.
Before examining the opinions from the sixth and last jurisdiction, it should
be noted that Delaware apparently has adopted a version of the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine that is broader than a mere rule of construction, but nar-
rower than Professor Keeton's formulation. In Hallowell v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Ins. Co.,65 the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged that it had previ-
ously adopted the doctrine, but declined to extend it as far as other jurisdictions
have done. The court stated that:
[W]e hold that the doctrine of reasonable expectations is applicable in Delaware to a
policy of insurance only if the terms thereof are ambiguous or conflicting, or if the
policy contains a hidden trap or pitfall, or if the fine print purports to take away what
is written in large print.59
One might argue that this language expresses no more than a rule of construc-
tion, particularly in view of the fact that the court went on to state that "the
doctrine is not a rule granting substantive rights to an insured when there is no
doubt as to the meaning of policy language."60 However, there is another, and
arguably more compelling, interpretation.
Construction of the two quotes together could lead to a conclusion that the
Delaware version of the doctrine grants substantive rights where there is doubt
as to the meaning of the policy even though the doubts arise from circumstances
other than ambiguous language. Thus, doubts could arise from the insurer's
activities in marketing the policy where particular language is emphasized in
general only to find later that there is an unexpected exclusion that defeats the
expectation of coverage under the particular facts, i.e., "a hidden trap or pit-
fall." Also, there may be no conflict or ambiguity where the "fine print" quali-
fies the "large print" in a surprising or extraordinary way. In such circum-
stances, it appears that the Delaware Supreme Court will recognize rights at
variance with the unambiguous language of a policy.6
The sixth jurisdiction is Colorado. In Davis v. M.L.G. Corp.,"5 the Supreme
Court of Colorado refused to enforce an unambiguous collision damage waiver
57. American Universal Ins. Co. v. Russell, 490 A.2d 60, 62 (R.I. 1985) (explaining that a prior decision
involving "stacking" of uninsured motorist coverage, Taft v. Cerwonka, 433 A.2d 215 (R.I. 1981), rested on a
holding that gave primary weight to the reasonable expectatiors of the insured).
58. 443 A.2d 925 (Del. 1982) (holding that uninsured motorist coverage as prescribed by the Delaware
statutes does not cover accident caused by underinsured motorist).
59. Id. at 928.
60. Id. at 927.
61. Subsequent to Hallowell, in an unpublished opinion, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that absent
an ambiguity "there is no need, or authority, for a court to apply rules of construction which require an insurance
contract to be construed in favor of the insured, or attempt to discern the reasonable expectations of the insured."
Derrickson v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 1113 (Del. 1988) (LEXIS, Delaware Library). However,
the court cited Hallowell as supporting this statement and gave no indication it was modifying or overruling it.
Derrickson did involve an ambiguity and, aside from being an unpublished opinion, there does not appear to be
any reason to believe the court has retrenched from the broader statements in Hallowell.
62. 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986).
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clause in a car rental agreement,6 3 holding that the clause violated the reasona-
ble expectations of the lessee and that the clause was unconscionable under the
circumstances." The court cited the original Keeton article and did not resort
to any rule of construction of ambiguous language in the course of reaching its
decision.65 Although two of the justices specially concurred, expressing no opin-
ion whether the doctrines concerning reasonable expectations and unconsciona-
bility can or should be applied to resolve other contract disputes, 6 the other
four participating justices indicated the lease contract sub judice was like an
insurance contract and should be governed by interpretive principles normally
applicable to such contracts.6 7 It appears, therefore, that a majority of the Colo-
rado court would probably apply the doctrine in insurance cases given the anal-
ogy that the court drew between lease contracts and insurance policies and the
court's recognition that the doctrine applied to insurance contracts. It appears,
therefore, that Colorado should be included with the other fifteen adopting ju-
risdictions even though the Supreme Court of Colorado has yet to apply it in an
insurance case.
Although, as is apparent from the foregoing discussion of the six questiona-
ble jurisdictions, one might quarrel over the exact number of states that have
recognized rights of insureds at variance with policy language, it is clear that a
substantial number of state courts of last resort have embraced the doctrine of
reasonable expectations. Whether one argues that there are ten or sixteen is not
as important as the point that the doctrine is no longer "emerging," but is,
without a doubt, fully in existence. Moreover, given the status of the remaining
jurisdictions, it is even clearer that the likelihood of further adoptions is very
strong indeed.
B. Prospects for Further Adoptions
Almost as important as the fact that a substantial number of jurisdictions
can be counted as having adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations in its
substantive form, is the fact that few courts have rejected the doctrine outright.
Although there are nine states whose courts have declared that the doctrine has
not been adopted,68 only the Supreme Court of Idaho has explicitly rejected the
63. A collision damage waiver clause is a common feature of lease agreements utilized by automobile rental
companies. The purpose of such a clause, when purchased by a lessee, is to relieve the lessee of liability for
property damage to the leased vehicle. These clauses, however, vary among rental companies and many do not
provide complete relief. See Berman & Bourne, Renters Cope With Auto Cover Woes, Nat'l Underwriter: Prop-
erty & Casualty/Employee Benefits Ed., May 4, 1987, at 24, col. 4. In any event, these clauses have the effect of
transferring the risk of loss and thereby resemble contracts of insurance. The court originally held that the waiver
clause constituted a contract of insurance, but on rehearing the opinion was withdrawn and the court reserved that
issue for another day. Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 986 (Colo. 1986).
64. Davis, 712 P.2d at 989-90.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 992-93.
67. Id. at 989, n.4.
68. Idaho: Casey v. Highland Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 509, 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (1979); Illinois: Bain v.
Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1032, 463 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (1984); Insurance Co. of N. Am.
v. Adkisson, 121 I1. App. 3d 224, 228-29, 459 N.E.2d 310, 312-14 (1984); Massachusetts: Bond Bros. v. Robin-
son, 393 Mass. 546, 551, 471 N.E.2d 1332, 1336 (1984); North Dakota: Walle Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 419
N.W.2d 176, 181, n.4 (N.D. 1988); Ohio: Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 30 Ohio App. 3d 131,
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doctrine,69 and even that decision was not unanimous.70 Of the remaining eight
courts, at least one has indicated it is receptive to the idea.7 '
The twenty-five jurisdictions that have not adopted the doctrine and that
have not expressed the fact of nonadoption fall into two general categories: (1)
those that have not really addressed the issue, and (2) those that have used a
test involving the reasonable expectation language, but have not used language
or provided other evidence that would justify a conclusion that the doctrine is
merely a rule of construction, or, on the other hand, is a rule to be applied to
the substance of an insurance policy without regard to the presence of ambigu-
ous language. The cases are almost evenly split between these two categories.
135, 506 N.E.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1986); Oklahoma: Anderson v. Continental Assurance Co., 666 P.2d 245, 248
(Okla. App. 1983); South Carolina: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mangum, 299 S.C. 226, 231, 383 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Ct.
App. 1989); Washington: Keenan v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co., 108 Wash. 2d 314, 322, 738 P.2d 270, 275
(1987); and Wyoming: St. Paul Fire & Marine v. Albany County School Dist. 1, 763 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Wyo.
1988).
69. Casey, 100 Idaho at 509, 600 P.2d at 1391 (Shepard, J., concurring in result).
In 1965, prior to the Keeton article, the Supreme Court of Oregon refused to follow the lead of California in
construing an unambiguous conditional receipt as creating a contract of temporary life insurance when it was
coupled with an initial premium payment. Morgan v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 240 Or. 113, 400 P.2d 223 (1965).
The majority opinion characterized the principal case relied on by the insured, Ransom v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954) as a "constructive' ambiguity case, I.e., one that really did not involve
an ambiguity. Morgan, 240 Or. at 116-17, 400 P.2d at 224-25. Ransom was the type of case Professor Keeton
used to make his point that courts were inventing ambiguities and that traditional doctrines would not justify such
a result, although he did not cite this particular case. See Keeton, Rights At Variance, supra note 1. Since three
justices, in dissenting in Morgan, took the position that Ransom should be followed, one could argue that the
doctrine of reasonable expectations was explicitly rejected in Oregon.
The Morgan case, however, was decided prior to any clear understanding that a new principle was emerging.
On the other hand, Oregon has yet to explicitly adopt the doctrine. See Lewis v. Aetna Ins. Co., 264 Or. 314, 505
P.2d 914 (1973) (concurring opinion relying on doctrine to find coverage under marine insurance policy). Thus, it
is not clear exactly where Oregon stands on the issue, because it does not appear that the doctrine, at least by that
name, has been explicitly rejected by the supreme court of that state. Oregon has been classified with those states
that have not given the doctrine the type of consideration so that an informed judgment may be made as to
whether the court would adopt the doctrine in any of its forms. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
70. In Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 616, 533 P.2d 737 (1975), Justice Shepard
authored an opinion adopting the doctrine of reasonable expectations, but Justices Donaldson and McFadden
dissented, specifically refusing to adopt the doctrine. The other members of the court at that time, Chief Justice
McQuade and Justice Bakes, concurred only in the conclusion reached by Justice Shepard. In Casey, 100 Idaho
505, 600 P.2d 1387 (1975), which was decided five years later, Justice Donaldson, now the Chief Justice, authored
the opinion rejecting the doctrine of reasonable expectations as a substantive rule and was joined by Justices
Bakes, McFadden and Bistline. Justice Shepherd merely concurred in the result.
For later decisions confirming that the doctrine was rejected in Casey, see Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
108 Idaho 597, 701 P.2d 217 (1985); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 627 P.2d 317 (1981); Wright
v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 208, 610 P.2d 567 (1980); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 100 Idaho 883, 606 P.2d 987
(1980).
71. See Moore v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 401 Mass. 1010, 519 N.E.2d 265 (1988); Lusalon,
Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 400 Mass. 767, 511 N.E.2d 595 (1987); Massachusetts Insurers Insol-
vency Fund v. Continental Cas. Co., 399 Mass. 598, 506 N.E.2d 118 (1987); Home Indem. Ins. Co. v. Merchants
Distrib., Inc., 396 Mass. 103, 483 N.E.2d 1099 (1985); Bond Bros., Inc. v. Robinson, 393 Mass. 546, 471 N.E.2d
1332 (1984). See also Boyle, supra note 8.
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Thirteen states fall in the second category;"2 leaving twelve jurisdictions that
either have not addressed the issue at all"3 or have addressed it insufficiently.7 4
72. Connecticut: Simses v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 175 Conn. 77, 394 A.2d 710 (1978)
(resolving ambiguity in life insurance conditional receipt on basis of applicant's reasonable expectations, but citing
authorities that support broader application); Georgia: Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 613, 299 S.E.2d 561
(1983) (wife would reasonably expect coverage and thus not barred from recovering under ambiguous home-
owner's policy because of co-insured-husband's arson); Indiana: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467
(Ind. 1985) (holding insured would reasonably expect coverage in deciding to adopt "multiple trigger" approach
in determining coverage for DES-related illnesses under ambiguous provision of comprehensive general liability
policy); Kansas: Gowing v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Kan. 78, 483 P.2d 1072 (1971) (applying reasonable
expectations of insured as a rule for resolving ambiguities), but see Tripp v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 210 Kan. 33,
499 P.2d 1155 (1972) (holding that application for life insurance, accompanied by initial premium payment, in
connection with issuance of conditional receipt creates temporary contract of insurance notwithstanding the provi-
sions of the application and receipt to the contrary); Kentucky: Simon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210
(Ky. 1987) (employing reasonable expectations of insured as a rule of construction in resolving ambiguous under-
insured motorist provision, but citing authorities that support broader application); Louisiana: Cataldie v. Louisi-
ana Health Service & Indem. Co., 456 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1984) (relying on statute prescribing cancellation clause,
but also citing reasonable expectations doctrine in holding that health insurer could not refuse to pay benefits by
cancelling policy after illness arose but before expenses were incurred), but see, Singlemann v. Connecticut Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., (E.D.La. 1989) (WESTLAW 145956) (noting that Cataldie had been legislatively overruled when
the legislature amended the statute relied upon in Cataldie. The court made no mention of the reasonable expec-
tations of the insured); Maine: Baybutt Constr. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914 (Me. 1983)
(holding business risk exclusion in comprehensive general liability policy was ambiguous, but also stating that
objective reasonable expectations of an insured will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provi-
sions would have negated those expectations) but see Peerless Ins. Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383 (Me. 1989)
(reversing Baybutt on the point that the comprehensive general liability policy was ambiguous); Michigan: Powers
v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exchange, 427 Mich. 602, 398 N.W.2d 411 (1986) (Williams, C.J., applying doctrine
of reasonable expectations to auto liability policy provisions that were less than clear at best and ambiguous at
worst, but aeknowledging that an ambiguity was not a prerequisite to the application of the doctrine, with one
justice concurring in the opinion, two justices concurring in result, and three justices concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Minnesota: Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn.
1985) (Wahl, J., with whom two justices concurred, adopted reasonable expectations doctrine without regard to
ambiguities in construing "visible marks of entry" requirement in burglary policy, but four justices, in concurring
specially, believed an ambiguity was present and would limit applicability of doctrine to such situations); Missis-
sippi: Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Miss., 427 So. 2d 139 (Miss. 1983) (in refusing, on public policy
grounds, to enforce cancellation clause that would deny benefits for expenses incurred after cancellation even
though illness or condition occurred during policy period, citing Keeton, Rights At Variance, supra note 1, in
support of holding); New Mexico: Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Calif., 90 N.M. 620, 567 P.2d 62
(1977) (dissenting opinion arguing that court had previously adopted doctrine of reasonable expectations without
regard to ambiguities in Pribble v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 84 N.M. 211, 501 P.2d 255 (1972)), but see Davison v.
Business Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 85 N.M. 796, 518 P.2d 776 (1974) (treating Pribble as limiting doctrine
to a rule of construction where ambiguity exists); Baker v. Armstrong, 106 N.M. 395, 744 P.2d 170 (1987) (using
test of reasonable expectations as a rule of construction); West Virginia: National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon &
Sons, 356 S.E.2d 488 (W. Va. 1987) (adopting reasonable expectations as rule of construction to resolve ambigui-
ties), but see Romano v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 362 S.E.2d 334, 336 (W. Va. 1987) (holding that
promotional materials for group life insurance created reasonable expectation of coverage which would be honored
despite language in master contract excluding coverage where employee not "actively at work"); and Wisconsin:
Garriguenc v. Love, 67 Wis. 2d 130, 226 N.W.2d 414 (1975) (the first in a long line of cases adopting the
doctrine as a rule of construction), but see Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 78, 358 N.W.2d 266
(1984) (wherein it was noted by Abrahamson, J., in a concurring opinion, that the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions may be used as a rule of construction or as a substantive rule. The opinion then pointed out that the court is
not clear on how it is lsing the doctrine in holding that the insurer has a duty to continue to defend even though
the policy states otherwise where policy limits are exhausted).
73. Research has not revealed any case involving the issue that has reached the highest courts of Arkansas,
Florida, and Tennessee.
74. In nine jurisdictions the doctrine was not given the type of consideration so that an informed judgment
may be made as to whether the court has or would adopt the doctrine in any of its forms. Maryland is included in
this category, but see Government Employers Ins. Co. v. Ropka, 74 Md. App. 249, 267, 536 A.2d 1214, 1223
(1988) (without discussing the doctrine or citing authorities adopting it, the court held that the insured has the
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Although the number of adoptions is impressive, one may also conclude
from some cases discussed above that there remains some ambivalence towards
right to expect that renewal policy will be substantially the same as expiring policy because this rule of law is
"consonant with the reasonable expectations of an insured").
Missouri sidestepped the issue by concluding that the application of the doctrine would be inappropriate in
the particular case because the contract involved a group insurance policy and the court said it was not a contract
of adhesion since it was negotiated by the employer. Robin v. Blue Cross Hoap. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695 (Mo.
1982), but see Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. App. 1981) (adopting the
doctrine without regard to ambiguities but holding that exclusion in question did not defeat insured's reasonable
expectations).
New York occupies a rather anomalous position since Professor Keeton relied on two early cases from that
jurisdiction, Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954) (involving marketing
methods of air-travel trip insurance) and Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 295 N.Y. 294, 67
N.E.2d 248 (1946) (refusing to make a distinction between accidental "means" and "result" in accident policy),
as the basis for arguing that a new principle honoring rights at variance with insurance contracts had emerged.
See Kecton, Rights At Variance, supra note 1, 970, 976. Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals has never
embraced the doctrine as articulated by Professor Keaton.
Oregon may also be included in this category, see discussion supra note 69.
South Dakota is also included here because, even though two dissenting justices of the supreme court have
argued for adoption of the doctrine, the majority did not discuss the issue. See Grandpre v. Northwestern Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 261 N.W.2d 804 (S.D. 1977). See also American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Mut. Ins.
Co., 276 N.W.2d 264 (S.D. 1979) (dissent arguing for application of doctrine, apparently as rule of construction).
There are two cases in Texas that should be mentioned, but the doctrine was not sufficiently considered in
either. See Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters, 706 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1986) (court held illegal destruc-
tion of jointly owned property by one coinsured does not bar recovery by an innocent coinsured because, inter alia,
latter would reasonably expect to be covered); Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.
1976) (court rejects distinction between accidental "means" and "result," a type of case relied on by Professor
Keeton as basis for arguing that new principle had emerged).
The Utah Supreme Court held that failure of the insurer to call the insured's attention to the existence of a
household exclusion clause in an auto liability policy rendered the exclusion void because "[w]ithout disclosure the
household exclusion clause fails to 'honor the reasonable expectations' of the purchaser," Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
Call, 712 P.2d 231, 237 (Utah 1985), but subsequently held in a 4 to 1 decision that the exclusion was enforceable
with respect to policy amounts in excess of the statutory minimum required amount, apparently deeming delivery
of the policy as providing the required notice to the insured, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987) (dissent arguing for adoption of reasonable expectations doctrine). See also Williams v.
First Colony Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979); Long v. United Benefit Life Ins., 29 Utah 2d 204, 507 P.2d
375 (1973); Prince v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co., 19 Utah 2d 174, 428 P.2d 163 (1967) (all dealing with the
use of conditional receipts in marketing life insurance, but not explicitly adopting doctrine of reasonable
expectations).
Two cases were decided by the Vermont Supreme Court in 1987 that touch on the issue, but are inconclusive
regarding that court's attitude toward the doctrine. In Sanders v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 148 Vt. 496, 512,
536 A.2d 914, 921 (1987), the court rejected arguments that an unambiguous "anti-stacking" provision in the
uninsured motorist coverage was either unconscionable or violated the reasonable expectations of the insured
under the facts of the case, pointing out that "[i]n the final analysis a policy meets the consumer's expectations if
the issuer complies with statutory requirements in every respect." In Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 149
Vt. 129, 131, 540 A.2d 648, 652 (1987), the court held that the limitations on the collision damage waiver
provision in an auto rental agreement were "substantively unfair" and that they "significantly restrict the rental
company's limitation on the renter's liability for damage to the vehicle in an unexpected and unconscionable
manner." (Emphasis added). The court discussed the Colorado decision in Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985
(Colo. 1986), but, unlike the court in Davis, made no analogy to insurance contracts.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in deciding whether punitive damages were covered under a liability policy,
stated that one line of cases construed the policy language in question to include punitive damages based on the
reasonable expectations of the insured. See United Services Auto Ass'n v. Webb, 235 Va. 655, 369 S.E.2d 196
(1988). The Webb court, however, held that the policy language was ambiguous and construed it in favor of the
insured without referring to the reasonable expectations of the insured. Id. at 658, 369 S.E.2d at 199. Moreover,
the court cited Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964) in support of its
holding. However, Lazenby did not consider the applicability of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. The case
was decided before the doctrine had been recognized. At most, Lazenby is simply a case of construing ambiguities
against the insurer and did not address the doctrine as it is understood today.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
adopting the doctrine. That may well be, considering the confusion over the
scope of the doctrine as it has evolved from a principle to full-blown doctrine,
i.e., a body of law from which particular cases can be readily resolved. Such
ambivalence is inherent in the common law where all "doctrines" were once
exceptions or accretions to other doctrines that have emerged to take on lives of
their own. Doctrines do not generally spring full-blown from any one case, or
for that matter from a single law review article, but must await development by
means of the fortuities of litigation.
Dean Leon Green, in commenting on the growth and development of the
common law, made an observation several years ago that is equally apt today:
What is startling, and only because of its rarity, in cases of serious departure from an
old principle or of recognition of a new one, is for a court to put its finger on the
particular policy relied upon. Here the courts are inclined to talk in terms of the
broadest generalities, or in terms of legal doctrines which in themselves make no dis-
closure. If disagreement is likely as to the policy that should control a decision, the
courts perhaps are justifiably hesitant about pinpointing it with precision, for policy
normally casts its shadow long before it takes definite form.7 5
The shadow of the doctrine of reasonable expectations and its underlying policy
justifications were cast over twenty years ago. Insurance contracts are generally
contracts of adhesion-standardized forms that by definition present little op-
portunity for negotiation. In the aggregate they embody a system of risk distri-
bution-a system that is essential to societal advancements. Yet as individual
contracts, they are rarely read by consumers, and even when read their ramifi-
cations are not sufficiently understood. Coverage as to the paradigm fact pattern
that gives rise to loss, along with the "dickered terms," may be appreciated, but
seldom does the average consumer have the experience and background to ap-
preciate the limitations for fact patterns that fall within the penumbral areas.
Courts, consequently, have exercised a more active role in resolving disputes
under these contracts and, in doing so, the underlying policy considerations have
produced a new body of law-first in the form of a principle and ultimately as a
doctrine. This process, as Dean Green points out, is the essence of the common
law. Although at any one time there may be unanswered questions about the
application of any doctrine, this residuum of uncertainty does not mean there
are no guidelines at all.
Although the form of the doctrine of reasonable expectations may not be
fully fixed yet in all jurisdictions, and may never be, a doctrinal core has been
identified by some of the courts that have viewed the doctrine as creating rights
at variance with unambiguous policy language. As a consequence, one may pre-
dict with considerable confidence that courts in the remaining jurisdictions will
recognize these developments and that any confusion over the nature of the
doctrine itself will rapidly dissipate. An examination of the current status of the
doctrine provides ample support for these conclusions.
75. Green, The Study and Teaching of Tort Law, 34 Tax. L. REv. 1, 15 (1955).
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V. CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE
A. A Re-examination of the Early Doctrinal Limitations
As previously noted, 6 Professor Keeton drew on a wide variety of cases in
identifying the nascent principle that has come to be known as the doctrine of
reasonable expectations. Although the formulation of the principle 77 was con-
cise, it remained tantalizingly vague, in some ways more interesting for what it
did not say than for what it did say. Nevertheless, what was conveyed should
not be minimized as it provided important doctrinal limitations. Initially the
reader is informed that not every expectation will be honored, but only those
that are judged to be reasonable by some objective standard. Did this mean only
that the reasonableness of the asserted expectation must be judged by what an
ordinarily prudent insured would have expected, as contrasted to a standard
that, in essence, turns on the good faith of the assertion by the particular in-
sured? If the former, does it mean that the insured must introduce extrinsic
evidence regarding the policy or some activity attributable to the insurer which
could be judged as reasonably fostering an expectation of coverage?
The requirement that the expectation have an objective basis indicates, at
the very least, that any expectation that is idiosyncratic would not be reasona-
ble, but it also goes further. It seems to require that there be some evidentiary
basis beyond naked belief on the part of the person seeking coverage, i.e., that it
be objectively determinable. The requirement that the expectation be objec-
tively determinable implies that there must be evidence of obfuscating factors
that could lead a reasonable insured to believe, for example, that a loss would
be covered even though the policy actually excludes the loss. The facts leading
to the confusion could consist of overly complex or technical policy language.
This possibility was apparently recognized in that aspect of the principle that
provided for its application when the policy could be understood only through a
very careful perusal. In such circumstances, even though it was possible to un-
derstand the policy, an insured reasonably might expect coverage because the
exclusion or lack of coverage could be understood only through a "painstaking
study," a study that a reasonable insured would not be expected to undertake.
On the other hand, the formulation was not apparent as to what would
happen if the policy could be understood without such a study. It did not pre-
clude the recognition that an expectation could still be objectively reasonable
even in the face of a simple and clearly worded policy provision. Where the
circumstances or factors could cause a reasonable insured to be ignorant of the
provision or, where the insured knows of the provision, but a reasonable insured
could believe the provision would not apply because of some obfuscating fact,
the doctrine may also apply. Thus, if the early formulation was incomplete, it
was only because it did not identify all the possible fact situations that would
meet the requirement that the expectation be objectively determinable. In short,
the formulation carefully accounted for the extant case law and its various fact
76. See supra note I and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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situations, but provided incomplete guidance as to new factual situations to
which it might apply. Moreover, there did not appear to be any self-evident,
common substantive factors running through these cases other than the require-
ment that the expectation be objectively determinable, as discussed above.
The fact that most modern insurance contracts have been, in many re-
spects, contracts of adhesion, and most likely have not been read or understood
provided the basis for arguing that the written application or insurance policy
should not always be the last and only word as to the insurer's obligation.7 8
Because there is no knowing agreement on the insured's part as to much of the
contract and because the lack of understanding is justified, the orthodox rules of
contract law need not be applied rigidly. On the contrary, courts, as Professor
Keeton so persuasively demonstrated, regularly were taking into account mat-
ters not included in traditional contract doctrines in the course of adjusting the
relationship memorialized in writing between the parties.
Not surprisingly, this practice was viewed as an untoward development by
the insurance industry, particularly since there appeared to be no clear bounda-
ries to the application of the new development.79 For example, some of the earli-
est cases involved the sale of life insurance."' Although a careful reading of a
conditional receipt issued upon application for life insurance would reveal that
the insurer had no intention to provide coverage before the application was ap-
proved, a number of courts held that a temporary contract of insurance came
into existence if the application was accompanied by an initial payment of pre-
mium.81 Although there may have been no ambiguity in the writings, the courts
sided with the applicant, or the beneficiary, in holding that under these circum-
stances the applicant had a reasonable expectation of immediate coverage. The
expectation was reasonable because there was no other apparent reason that
was sufficient for the requirement that the premium payment be made at that
stage of the process. The fact that the insurer could demonstrate that the appli-
cant would benefit in some ways under this marketing process, even without the
immediate coverage,82 was not enough to overcome the obfuscating fac-
tor-requirement of premium payment prior to approval of the application. The
expectation of immediate coverage had to be negated specifically by the insurer
78. Keeton, Rights At Variance, supra note I at 966-68. See also Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, supra note 8 at 530.
79. See, e.g., Squires, supra note 7.
80. The earliest life insurance marketing case most often cited as foreshadowing the principle of reasonable
expectations is Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
849 (1947). See also Ransom v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954); Allen v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 425 P.2d
346 (1967).
81. All of the cases in the immediately preceding footnote came to this conclusion.
82. The possible benefits were outlined in Gaunt, 160 F.2d at 601:
(1) The policy would sooner become incontestable. (2) It would earlier reach maturity, with a correspond-
ing acceleration of dividends and cash surrender. (3) It would cover the period after "approval" and
before "issue." (4) If the insured became uninsurable between "completion" and "approval" it would still
cover the risk. (5) If the insured's birthday was between "completion" and "approval," the premium
would be computed at a lower rate. (6) When the policy covers disability, the coverage dates from
"completion."
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in v straightforward manner capable of being proved in court.83 Perhaps such
neation could be made by explicitly notifying the applicant of the fact that
there was no immediate coverage,8' notification that was generally manageable
by the insurers because the application was usually solicited in person by an
agent of the insurer. In any event, had the courts merely applied the doctrine of
reasonable expectations to life insurance marketing cases, there may have been
no reason for insurers to worry. However, insurers did begin to worry, and they
had good reason.
Although negation of the applicant's expectations may be manageable in a
marketing situation where the soliciting agent frequently is in direct personal
contact with the applicant, similar results in favor of insureds were being
reached in other insurance marketing situations where the obfuscation had to do
with coverage provisions within the actual insurance contract,85 as contrasted to
misunderstandings created by the particular application process. Moreover,
other early cases made plain that enforceable expectations could be created at
any time in the course of the insurance relationship88 and not just at inception. 7
Some assertions of expectations recognized by the courts even had an ad hoc
quality to them,8 making it even more difficult to predict to what circumstances
the doctrine would apply because an obfuscating factor raising a reasonable
expectation of coverage could now be identified at any stage of the insurance
relationship. Nevertheless, despite the warnings of some critics,89 the doctrine
has not been applied with abandon. This cautious application is probably attrib-
utable to the conservative manner in which the doctrine has developed.
83. Several of the early cases indicated that the insurer must make the effect of the conditional receipt
unequivocally clear to the applicant if the insurer expected to prevail in court. See, e.g., Gaunt, 160 F.2d at 601;
Ransom, 43 Cal. 2d at 425, 274 P.2d at 636; Prudential Ins. Co., 83 Nev. at 149, 425 P.2d at 348.
84. See Keeton, Honoring Reasonable Expectations in the Interpretation of Life and Health Insurance Con-
tracts, supra note 6 at 218. See also R. KEETON & A. WiDiss. INsu ,IcE LAw § 6.3(c)(1) (1988).
85. Two early cases involved the marketing of air-travel trip insurance through vending machines at airports.
The courts refused to enforce policy restrictions that eliminated coverage while the insured was traveling on cer-
tain types of aircraft. See Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377 P.2d 284 (1962);
Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
86. See, e.g., Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961) (interpreting meaning
of "accidental bodily injuries" under accident policy); Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 225 A.2d
328 (1966) (deciding whether homeowners policy provided coverage for a worker's compensation claim).
87. Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 255 A.2d 208 (1969) (oral representation by insurer's agent, after
inception of policy, that insured would be "fully covered" created reasonable expectation of coverage despite
specific exclusion in policy for loss in question).
88. It would be reasonable for the applicant, and any prospective beneficiary that knew of the application, for
life insurance to have a general understanding that coverage was effective from the time the premium was paid,
but it is more difficult to assume that a purchaser of property insurance would be conversant with all the different
risks covered under that type of policy and have formed an expectation of coverage for each of the risks involved.
The expectation would arise only after the loss resulted from the specific fact situation which in many instances
would not be contemplated. For example, it would be somewhat incredulous to assume that a homeowner would
have actually thought about the potential liability for such a risk as a workers' compensation claim by a domestic
employee and whether that risk was covered under a homeowners policy. See Gerhardt, 48 N.J. at 291, 225 A.2d
at 328.
89. See, e.g., Anderson, Reasonable Expectations and Insurance Contracts: What Should We Reasonably
Expect from Judges, supra note 7; Gardner, supra note 7; Squires, supra note 7.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:823
B. Doctrinal Developments
Although at least a score of jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations over the last twenty years,90 the more significant substan-
tive developments in the doctrine have occurred in two states-first Iowa and
then Arizona. It is doubtful that either of these jurisdictions would have readily
come to mind in 1970 as the predicted source of these developments. New
Jersey would have been a more logical choice as a good number of the cases
foreshadowing the doctrine arose in that jurisdiction."' Another logical choice
might have been California, given the leadership role its courts had played in
common law developments in the decades after World War IIP2 and the fact
that the ground work for further developments in the doctrine of reasonable
expectations had been laid in several early cases.9 Be that as it may,9' the more
90. See supra notes 22-67 and accompanying text.
91. See Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 255 A.2d 208 (1969); Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 48
N.J. 291, 225 A.2d 328 (1966); Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965); Kievit v.
Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961).
92. The court was particularly active in tort law development. For example, see State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (recognizing a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962) (recognizing strict liability in tort for defective products); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d
561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (abandoning the common law distinctions among various classes of entrants on real
property and adopting a standard of reasonable care); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72 (1968) (recognizing a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystanding parent where
a child is injured even though the parent was not physically impacted or in the zone of danger).
93. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966); Steven v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co. of N.Y., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962); Ransom v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954).
94. There have been a number of decisions in New Jersey involving the principle of reasonable expectations,
sometimes where there was an ambiguity and other times not, but they have added little in the way of doctrinal
advancements. See Werner Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 112 N.J. 30, 548 A.2d 188 (1988) (whether excess
policy "dropped down" upon insolvency of primary carrier, no ambiguity involved); Meire v. New Jersey Life Ins.
Co., 101 N.J. 597, 503 A.2d 862 (1986) (whether life insurance policy had been terminated, ambiguity involved);
Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 NJ. 325, 495 A.2d 406 (1985) (coverage of "claims made" professional liability
policy, no ambiguity involved); Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 100 NJ. 304, 495 A.2d 395 (1985)
(coverage of "claims made" professional liability policy, no ambiguity involved); Gottfried v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 82 N.J. 478, 414 A.2d 544 (1980) (construing meaning of "accidental bodily injuries," no ambiguity
involved); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc. 81 N.J. 233, 405 A.2d 788 (1979) (construing "business risk" exclusion
in comprehensive general liability policy, no ambiguity involved); Fenwick Machinery, Inc. v. A. Tomae & Sons,
Inc., 79 NJ. 590, 401 A.2d 1087 (1979) (whether contractor's equipment floater policy covered damage to un-
scheduled equipment leased to insured, no ambiguity involved); DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 79 N.J. 257,
398 A.2d 1274 (1979) (whether vehicle was furnished for regular use of insured under nonowned auto coverage,
no ambiguity involved); Bryan Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 60 NJ. 375, 290 A.2d 138
(1972) (whether umbrella policy covered losses not covered by underlying policies, ambiguity involved); Perrino v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 56 N.J. 120, 265 A.2d 521 (1970) (construing "accidental means" test in accident
policy, no ambiguity involved).
California has produced one significant case. Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 539 P.2d 433,
123 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1975). The California Supreme Court held that, not only did the use of a conditional receipt
coupled with an initial premium payment by an applicant for life insurance create a temporary contract of insur-
ance in the absence of actual notice to the applicant that there would be no temporary coverage, but the coverage
would stay in effect until the applicant was notified that the application had been rejected and the applicant
received a refund of the premium. This case, however, did not add anything to the state of the doctrinal art that
was not already known from such prior cases as Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 425 P.2d 346
(1967) and Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965). For other California cases
involving the doctrine of reasonable expectations, but without any material doctrinal amplification, see White v.
Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985) (title insurance construed in
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substantive developments have come from courts that recognized the doctrine
for the first time only during the last two decades.
Iowa first acknowledged the existence of the doctrine in 1973 in Rodman v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.,95 a case in which the insured had not read
the policy and was unaware that it contained a provision excluding liability cov-
erage for bodily injury to the insured or any resident relative of the insured's
household. The insured testified that he would not have purchased the policy
had he known of the exclusion. The court, however, decided that the doctrine
should not be extended to situations where an ordinary layman would not mis-
understand the coverage from a reading of the policy in the absence of other
circumstances attributable to the insurer which would foster coverage expecta-
tions." The court did not elaborate on what the "other circumstances" might be
beyond an indication that they would include insurance company conduct when
the policy was issued.97 This position was not new, as the early life and air-
travel trip insurance cases from other jurisdictions demonstrated. Several such
cases found coverage where insurer actions during the marketing process fos-
tered reasonable expectations. 8 Thus, the doctrine had a rather modest begin-
ning in Iowa, but there was more to come.
The Iowa Supreme Court had the opportunity to apply the doctrine again
several years later and on that occasion the court was more definite as to its
doctrinal aspects. In 1975 the court, in deciding C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied
Mutual Ins. Co.,"9 had before it a situation where the insured specifically re-
quested coverage for burglary, but unbeknownst to him the policy defined bur-
glary in a peculiar way. The definition excluded coverage of any occurrence
accordance with reasonable expectations of insured and public); Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 3d 425,
696 P.2d 1308, 212 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1985) (meaning of "suicide, sane or insane" exclusion of life insurance
policy); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 640 P.2d 746, 180 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1982) (whether step-son
was a "family" member for purpose of exclusion in watercraft liability policy, ambiguity involved); Signal Cos. v.
Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 612 P.2d 889, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1980) (doctrine of reasonable expectations
not applicable where contract is between two insurers); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Sam Harris Constr. Co., 22
Cal. 3d 409, 583 P.2d 1335, 149 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1978) (meaning of "occurrences or accidents" during policy
period, ambiguity involved); National Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 17 Cal. 3d 380, 551 P.2d 362, 131 Cal. Rptr.
42 (1976) (construing term "insured" under aircraft liability policy); Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 3d 216,
514 P.2d 1219, 110 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1973) (construing "claims made" professional liability policy, ambiguity
involved); Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 9 Cal. 3d 904, 513 P.2d 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1973)
(construing conditional receipt in marketing life insurance, ambiguity involved); Wint v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of
N.Y., 9 Cal. 3d 257, 507 P.2d 1383, 107 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1973) (construing "business pursuit" exclusion in
homeowners policy, ambiguity involved); Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 3d 319, 482
P.2d 193, 93 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1971) (construing Banker's Blanket Bond where forged documents were used to
secure loan); Hogan v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553, 476 P.2d 825, 91 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1970) (whether
term "accident" in general liability policy covered expenses which resulted from a third party having to overcom-
pensate for a saw manufactured by insured that failed to cut lumber in proper widths); Herzog v. National
American Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 192, 465 P.2d 841, 84 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1970) (construing "ways immediately adjoin-
ing" premises language in homeowners policy).
95. 208 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1973).
96. Id. at 908.
97. Id.
98. See Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849
(1947); Ransom v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 425 P.2d 346 (1967). See also Steven v, Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377
P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962); Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
99. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
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which was not evidenced by visible marks of entry on the exterior of the prem-
ises at the point of entry.100 Under the facts of the case there was considerable
physical evidence inside the building that a burglary had occurred, but there
were no visible marks of entry on the exterior of the building. This circumstance
did not negate the fact that a burglary had occurred because it was possible to
force open one of the exterior doors, even though it was locked, without causing
physical damage or otherwise leaving marks. 10' Although there was testimony
that the insurer's agent informed the insured there had to be visible evidence of
burglary to recover under the policy, there was no testimony that the insured
was ever informed or knew that the evidence must consist of visible marks of
entry on the exterior of the premises at the place of entry. 0 2
As background for its decision, the court reviewed a number of authorities
describing the modern revolution in the manner of formation of contractual re-
lationships and the proliferation of standard form contracts.' 0 ' The court went
on to quote approvingly from what was to become section 211 (at that time
denominated as section 237)14 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. In
fact, the court equated the doctrine of reasonable expectations that had devel-
oped under insurance law with the test that the American Law Institute was in
the process of formulating as an exception to the general rule regarding enforce-
ability of standardized agreements. 0 5 The thrust of the rule under section 211
is that standardized written agreements will be enforced without regard to
knowledge or understanding of the standard terms where a party to such an
agreement has reason to believe that like writings are regularly used to embody
terms of the same type. 0 6 The rule, however, is qualified by an exception.
Where the other party, the insurer in our case, has reason to believe that the
party manifesting such assent, the insured, would not do so if he knew that the
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement. 0 7
The American Law Institute had come to the conclusion that a number of cases
100. Id. at 171.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 173-76.
104. Section 237 of the first Restatement of Contracts stated the parole evidence rule. In the initial draft of
the second Restatement, section 237 dealt with the legal effects of standardized agreements. R-EsTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACTS, § 237 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 31, 1970). This section was later renumbered and adopted as
section 211 of the final draft of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONMraCrS
§ 211 (1981).
105. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d at 176.
106. Section 211. Standardized Agreements
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise manifests assent
to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements
of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in
the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated, without
regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if
he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 211 (1981).
107. Id.
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construing form contracts had recognized an exception and that these cases had
to be accounted for in the revised Restatement of Contracts.
Although section 211 does not itself define what constitutes "reason to be-
lieve," the comments elaborate on this point. In an attempt to clarify the appli-
cation of the exception in C & J Fertilizer, the Iowa court quoted from the
comment:
Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and are bound
by them without even appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not
bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation. A
debtor who delivers a check to his creditor with the amount blank does not authorize
the insertion of an infinite figure. Similarly, a party who adheres to the other party's
standard terms does not assent to a term if the other party has reason to believe that
the adhering party would not have accepted the agreement if he had known that the
agreement contained the particular term. Such a belief or assumption may be shown
by the prior negotiations or inferred from the circumstances. Reason to believe may be
inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, from the fact that it
eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it elimi-
nates the dominant purpose of the transaction. The inference is reinforced if the ad-
hering party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise
hidden from view. This rule is closely related to the policy against unconscionable
terms and the rule of interpretation against the draftsman." 8
This comment provided the rationale for the court's refusal to enforce the policy
definition of burglary. The court said that the insured was not aware of the
definition of burglary, that the definition was inconsistent with either a lay or
legal concept of the crime, and that the definition defeated the dominant pur-
pose of purchasing the policy.'" 9 It, in effect, eviscerated the coverage specifi-
cally bargained for, i.e., protection against burglary.
The C & J Fertilizer opinion was a very important development in several
respects. First, it incorporated in an insurance case the doctrinal underpinnings
of the American Law Institute's exception to the general rule of enforceability
of standardized agreements. Thus, insurance contracts, like other standardized
agreements, would be enforced as written, even though not read or understood,
unless the insurer had "reason to believe" that the insured would not have as-
sented to the term. Moreover, the comments to section 211 adopted by the court
provided some long needed generalizations beyond the specific holdings on the
facts of the supporting cases when they described some of the obfuscating fac-
tors that would be recognized as fostering enforceable expectations on the part
of an insured. Lastly, the opinion lent legitimacy to the doctrine of reasonable
expectations in insurance law by identifying it as a doctrine that was recognized
and supported by the American Law Institute. 1" 0 Having been stamped with the
imprimatur of that prestigious organization, the doctrine could hardly be viewed
108. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d at 176 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 211 comment f at 540-41 (1981)).
109. Id. at 176-77.
110. The American Law Institute clearly contemplated that insurance transactions were within the purview
of section 211 at the time it was drafted. The Reporter's Note cites the Keeton article, among others, and a
number of the cases discussed in the article in support of the new section and the exception to it. RESTATEMENT
(SiOND) OF CONTRAcTS § 211 at 124 (1981).
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as unorthodox. This opinion made a major contribution to the development of
the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
The Supreme Court of Arizona followed in Iowa's footsteps nine years
later. In its initial decisions adopting the doctrine of reasonable expectations,
the court merely used the terminology without citing any authority beyond the
traditional rule of construction for ambiguous contract language.,1 In 1984,
however, the Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co." 2
decision made clear that the doctrine in its substantive form would apply in
Arizona. In its opinion, the court noted that the concept was troublesome since
most insureds develop a "reasonable expectation" that every loss will be covered
by their policies and that the concept "must be limited by something more than
the fervent hope usually engendered by loss."" l3 The Arizona court, like the
Iowa court, concluded that the formulation in section 211 provided a workable
resolution of the problem. 1 4 The "dickered deal" is not to be undercut by the
boilerplate provisions of a standard form contract, nor should such provisions be
allowed to eviscerate reasonably expected coverage." 5 Again, the role of the
American Law Institute in recognizing the exception cannot be
underestimated."'$
Now that two courts of last resort have justified their acceptance of the
doctrine of reasonable expectation by reliance on the authority of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, others undoubtedly will rely on the same authority.
Does this reliance mean that the Restatement, and in particular the comment to
section 211, provides the outer boundaries of the doctrine or is section 211 just
a way station on the road to further doctrinal developments? The next section
will address this question.
C. Is There Life Beyond Section 211?
The "black letter" formulation of the Restatement reflects the American
Law Institute's conservative approach in its recognition of an exception to the
rule that standardized agreements will be enforced as written. The exception
was narrowly drawn so as to assess the situation from the drafter's perspective:
"Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term,
the term is not part of the agreement."" 21 Only where a party has "reason to
111. In the first case, the court in construing an ambiguity merely said ". .. the language should be ex-
amined from the viewpoint of one not trained in law or in the insurance business." Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 534, 647 P.2d 1127, 1132 (1982). In the second case, the court in refusing to strictly
enforce an unambiguous 12 month time limit for bringing suit under a standard fire policy said the consumer's
reasonable expectation of coverage "will not be defeated by the existence of provisions which were not negotiated
and in the ordinary case are unknown to the insured," citing Sparks as the only authority. Zuckerman v. Tran-
samerica Ins. Co., 133 Ariz. 139, 146, 650 P.2d 441, 448 (1982).
112. 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388 (1984).
113. Id. at 390, 682 P.2d at 395.
114. Id. at 390-94, 682 P.2d at 396-99.
115. Id. at 390-91, 682 P.2d at 396-97.
116. The majority and concurring opinions relied heavily on the fact that the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts recognized the doctrine as part of orthodox contract law. Id. at 390-91, 400-01, 682 P.2d at 396-97, 405.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTPACeTS § 211(3) (1981).
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believe" 118 that the other party, one who understands that a typical form con-
tract is being used, would not have assented to a particular term is that term to
be ignored. In most modem insurance transactions, there would be little argu-
ment over the fact that the insured would be taken to understand that a typical
or standard form was being used to embody the agreement. On the other hand,
application of the exception requires taking the perspective of the insurer.111 As
it is almost always the insured who will want to avoid a term of the policy or
form contract, the decision maker asked to apply the exception must focus on
information that was available to the insurer, i.e., what the insurer had reason
to believe. If adhered to faithfully, this approach could disclose a significantly
different "reasonable belief" from that derived by application of the Keeton
formulation-the objectively determinable reasonable expectations of the in-
sured. 210 The difference in result with the Keeton formulation is likely because
this formulation does not dictate any particular perspective.
In a relationship between insurer and insured, the insurer knows more
about insurance transactions and will therefore know many things of which the
insured is quite likely ignorant. For example, the insurer will be conversant with
important underwriting considerations-including differentials in premiums
arising from the inclusion or exclusion of certain terms or clauses, the preva-
lence of certain terms or clauses in various types of policies, and the problems
arising from the claims process where certain terms or clauses are omitted. The
fact that the insurer probably has this information could well affect a decision
about what an insurer had reason to believe about an insured's expectations. A
court might conclude, in such circumstances, that the insurer did not have "rea-
son to believe"-a term that may require a stronger form of cognition than
"reason to know," 2 1-that the insured would not have assented.
The insurer should be entitled to prove the complete extent of its knowl-
edge in any determination of whether it had reason to believe even though the
standard employed in section 211(3) is an objective one. 22 For example, should
not the insurer's perspective include a life insurer's knowledge of the benefits of
a conditional receipt that inure to an insured? And should not this knowledge
tip the scales away from a finding that a reasonable insurer had "reason to
believe" that an applicant would expect immediate coverage? What about the
marketing of air-travel trip insurance through vending machines? Should not
118. In the original tentative draft of section 211 (then Section 237), the Reporter used the phrase "reason to
know" but this was changed to "reason to believe" during the drafting process. It was suggested that the latter
was more restrictive and would narrow the applicability of the exception. See 47 A.L.L Paoc. 525, 534 (1970).
119. See Murray, The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. Ray. 1342, 1378 (1975).
120. See supra notes 10 and 76-77 and accompanying text.
121. Perhaps this is why the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts thought "believe" was
more restrictive than "know." See supra note 118.
122. This is made clear by the Reporter's response to an inquiry regarding the nature of the standard, Le.,
whether it involved an objective or subjective determination:
PROFESSOR BRAUCHER. Well, "reason to believe" is an objective standard requiring the exer-
cise of judgment by the reasonable man, but it is a judgment exercised in the light of the facts available to
the party whose reason to believe is in question ....
47 A.L.I. Ptoc 535 (1970).
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the insurer's knowledge about the greater incidence of private aircraft accidents
in contrast to those of commercial airlines weigh in the balance and affect the
decision as to whether an insured's expectations of being covered for all types of
air travel were reasonable? The fact that a reasonable insurer may be aware
that insureds do not understand the terms of a conditional receipt or the limita-
tions of air-travel trip insurance should not be ignored. Nevertheless, the entire
body of knowledge of the insurer surely should be considered in a determination
of what should have been "reasonably believed" by the insurer. Thus, the Re-
statement formulation contains a perspective, perhaps even a bias, that does not
exist in the Keeton formulation or, more importantly, in any of the decisions
that adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations prior to C & J Fertilizer
and Darner Motor Sales. In contrast with the Restatement formulation, these
formulations would appear to be more faithful to the notion that the drafter of
the adhesion agreement must bear the consequences of any reasonable misun-
derstanding by the adhering party, even where there is no ambiguity in the
language of the contract, so long as the misunderstanding was fostered by the
drafter. There is no requirement that the insurer be aware of facts that would
cause it to believe the insured's expectations would be defeated. Moreover, there
is no requirement that the facts even be available to the insurer so that it should
have known of the insured's expectations. The insurer could be completely igno-
rant of the obfuscating factors or their effect and the insured might still prevail.
In addition to the requirement that courts consider the insurer's perspective
when asked to apply the exception set out in section 211, the entire section
seems to contemplate that application of the exception requires a conclusion
that the insurer had "reason to believe" that the insured would misunderstand a
particular term, not merely that the insurer had "reason to believe" that the
insured would expect the contract as a whole to provide coverage that it in fact
did not provide . 23 This interpretation of the section is reinforced by the notion
that there must be an actual offending term-one that is bizarre or oppressive,
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction, or eviscerates terms which
were the subject of actual agreement-not merely an omission or failure to pro-
vide coverage. In other words, the exception under section 211 can be applied,
arguably, only to actual terms establishing exclusions, conditions, or definitions
that affect the insured's expectations about another term, for example a cover-
age provision, in the policy. It cannot be applied to create a coverage provision
that is not already present in the policy.'24 This limitation does not exist in the
Keeton formulation.
123. Although the Reporter indicated there was no intent not to cover the case of expected but omitted
terms, id. at 526-27, the matter was not clarified in the final draft. Perhaps the Reporter believed such situations
would be adequately covered under the law of reformation, Id. at 533-34, because this would be a term that the
insurer had reason to believe the insured wanted included. Thus, there would be either a mutual mistake or
unilateral mistake induced by inequitable conduct on the part of the insurer, types of conduct that give rise to the
remedy of reformation. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF R mBDiEs § 11.6 (1973).
124. This position would be consistent with what was once clearly the majority rule that the doctrine of
estoppel is not available to bring within the coverage of an insurance policy risks not covered by its terms, see
Annot. 1 A.L.R.3d 1149, but there are a growing number of jurisdictions that have rejected it. Two of the juris-
dictions that have adopted the minority position happen to be states that have clearly adopted the doctrine of
reasonable expectations. See Darner Motor Sales v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 395, 682 P.2d
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Did the supreme courts of Iowa and Arizona mean to adopt these more
restrictive formulations of the Restatement? The answer to this question is not
readily apparent from a reading of C & J Fertilizer because that opinion indi-
cates that even the insurer's agent in the case at issue was surprised by the
policy's narrow definition of burglary," 5 a fact that constitutes strong evidence
that the insurer had reason to believe that the insured would not have agreed to
the term. This evidence would clearly support a finding that the definition would
be surprising to an insured, perhaps even bizarre, and that this information was
available to the insurer. In addition, the insured had specific concerns about
coverage for burglary and had discussed these with the agent. These discussions
addressed the requirement that there must be evidence of entry but not the
requirement that the evidence must consist of visible marks on the exterior point
of entry. 2 ' Thus, the included definition limited the coverage that the insured
expected to receive, thereby undercutting the dominant purpose of the contract.
Finally, there did not appear to be any attempt on the part of the insurer to
take advantage of the test under section 211 at trial,'12 7 an understandable omis-
sion when it was not clear that the Restatement formulation was or would be
the law in Iowa.
Had the insurer resorted to the Restatement test, evidence of the claims
processing experience of the industry under burglary policies surely would have
been relevant. The fact that an insured easily could claim burglary when in fact
the loss involved a theft by an employee or other "inside job" would be weighed
in a determination whether the insurer had "reason to believe" that the insured
would have objected to the definition. Should not the cost of coverage without
the requirement of exterior visible marks of entry also be relevant to the deci-
sion whether the insured would have assented? There is no mention of these
factors in the case. In short, there was little specific reference to what the in-
surer had reason to believe, although the evidence would support a finding that
the insurer had reason to believe that the insured expected coverage.
As to the question of whether the Restatement exception may be employed
to create coverage that did not otherwise exist, the C & J Fertilizer opinion
does not contribute to an answer. The policy in question did provide coverage,
but that coverage was unduly narrowed by another term, the policy definition of
burglary.
Later cases, while acknowledging that C & J Fertilizer refined the concept
of reasonable expectations in Iowa, 2 8 omit any reference to the insurer's "rea-
388, 400 (1984); Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 305, 255 A.2d 208, 218 (1969). But see State v. Under-
writers at Lloyds, London, 755 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1988) (indicating doctrine of reasonable expectations may not
apply to create coverage that does not otherwise exist).
125. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 171-72 (Iowa 1975).
126. Id.
127. The requirement of visible marks of entry for burglary and similar coverages was not a rare provision in
the insurance world. Insurers had begun to employ such a provision because of the ease with which an insured
could assert a burglary claim absent such a provision and to distinguish it from other coverages that provided for
employee dishonesty and mysterious disappearance.
128. See, e.g., Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Voeltz, 431 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Iowa 1988) (holding that
insureds would reasonably expect coverage for liability for baby-sitting activities under homeowners policy and
that insurer knew the "business pursuits" exclusion was ambiguous on this point).
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son to believe."""9 That portion of the comment to section 211 is no longer men-
tioned. In its place, the Supreme Court of Iowa appears to have adopted a more
neutral test along the lines of the Keeton formulation. In doing so, the court has
repeated the basic proposition that the doctrine is an exception to the general
rule of enforceability. If the insurance policy or related form is not ambiguous,
i.e., if an ordinary person would not misunderstand the extent of coverage from
a reading of the standardized form, the doctrine of reasonable expectations does
not apply unless there are other circumstances attributable to the insurer which
fostered the insured's expectations. 30 The "other circumstances" include the
three situations set out in the comment to section 211 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts. A term that (1) is bizarre or oppressive, (2) eviscerates other
terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant purpose of the trans-
action will not be enforced.' 3' Borrowing further from this comment, the Iowa
court has held that reasonable expectations may be established by proof of the
underlying negotiations or inferred from the circumstances, 132 but there is no
mention of whether these activities might induce a reasonable expectation of
coverage that did not otherwise exist. Finally, the court also has decided that
the issue of whether the insured's expectations are reasonable is one of law
solely for the court to decide, except where a question of fact may arise through
the introduction of extrinsic evidence. 33 In short, it is not clear at this point
that Iowa strictly follows the Restatement, but neither is it clear that Iowa
intends to deviate from the Restatement rule or what form such deviation will
take.
Like the Iowa court, the Supreme Court of Arizona has not emphasized
the restriction in the Restatement that the insurer must have reason to believe
that the insured would not have assented to the offending term.13 4 On the other
hand, there is stronger indication that the Arizona court does not view the Re-
statement formulation as the final word on the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions. In Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"3 5 a wife, who was not
living with her husband at the time of the accident, brought an action to collect
uninsured motorist benefits under a policy that required her to be a resident of
her husband's household. Despite the absence of any ambiguity in policy lan-
guage, the Arizona Supreme Court held that there were substantial issues of
material fact on the question whether the doctrine of reasonable expectations
made the restriction unenforceable. In its opinion, the court synthesized the ex-
isting Arizona cases and other authorities and described the situations in which
129. See Moritz v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 434 N.W.2d 624, 626 (Iowa 1989); AID (Mutual) Ins. v.
Steffen, 423 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Iowa 1988); Lepic v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 402 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 1987);
Cairns v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 398 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Iowa 1987); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 112 (Iowa 1981).
130. Farm Bureau Mutual, 302 N.W.2d at 112-13.
131. See cases cited supra note 129.
132. Cairns, 398 N.W.2d at 825; Farm Bureau Mutual, 302 N.W.2d at 112.
133. Moritz, 434 N.W.2d at 626; C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d at 172. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212, comment d (1981).
134. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
135. 154 Ariz. 266, 742 P.2d 277 (1987).
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the doctrine applies. Standardized provisions of insurance contracts will not be
enforced, even though unambiguous, in the following categories of situations:
1. Where the contract terms, although not ambiguous to the court, cannot be
understood by the reasonably intelligent consumer who might check on his or her
rights, the court will interpret them in light of the objective, reasonable expectations of
the average insured . ..;
2. Where the insured did not receive full and adequate notice of the term in
question, and the provision is either unusual or unexpected, or one that emasculates
apparent coverage . ..;
3. Where some activity which can be reasonably attributed to the insurer would
create an objective impression of coverage in the mind of a reasonable insured . .. ;
4. Where some activity reasonably attributable to the insurer has induced a par-
ticular insured reasonably to believe that he has coverage, although such coverage is
expressly and unambiguously denied by the policy. ... ISO
The first category incorporates that aspect of the Keeton formulation sug-
gesting that overly technical wording or complicated arrangements of terms
may result in an "objectively determinable reasonable expectation" of coverage
even though restrictive terms might be understood through "painstaking"
study.13 7 The Arizona court establishes a test of whether a reasonably intelli-
gent consumer might understand the terms, but the court does not make clear
whether extrinsic evidence will be admissible on this issue and, if so, whether,
when the evidence is conflicting, it will be the trier of fact's responsibility to
decide the issue.'1 8 This category includes situations with more of the character-
istics of the situations regarding a rule construing ambiguities and complements
those situations that are covered by section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. Although the first category involves an important and well settled
application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the Arizona court's appli-
cation of the doctrine to situations included in it does not reveal anything about
the operation of section 211. The application of the doctrine of reasonable ex-
pectations to the fourth category of situations may be equally unrevealing.
The fourth category is somewhat of an anomaly. It appears to include situ-
ations that are already covered by orthodox doctrines that for some time have
been employed in the judicial regulation of contractual relations. For example,
application of the doctrine would appear to provide an exception to the parol
evidence rule in that evidence extrinsic to the written agreement could be intro-
duced to prove a claim of waiver, estoppel or election. Also, a suit for reforma-
tion would seem to be within its purview. Perhaps there may be some cases that
would not be covered by these doctrines, but they are not readily apparent and
the cases covered by the category seem to add little to the doctrine of reasona-
ble expectations. The remaining categories, however, are instructive.
The second category includes those situations covered by the exception to
section 211, i.e., situations where there are unusual or unexpected terms not
136. Id. at 272-73, 742 P.2d at 283-84.
137. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
138. In addition to the Supreme Court of Iowa, see supra note 133 and accompanying text, the Supreme
Court of Alaska has ruled that the issue of reasonable expectations is a legal question for the court. See INA Life
Ins. Co. v. Brundin, 533 P.2d 236, 246 (Alaska 1975); O'Neill Investigations Inc. v. Illinois Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 636 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1981); Jarvis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 633 P.2d 1359 (Alaska 1981).
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known to the insured. It, however, goes beyond section 211 in that it does not
require that the issue of reasonable expectations be viewed from the insurer's
perspective. As indicated earlier, inclusion of such situations is a significant de-
parture from the Restatement. On the other hand, the court in describing this
category does speak of a policy "term" or "provision," which may indicate that
it does not include situations where the expectation is of coverage that does not
otherwise exist. If the court's formulation is limited in this way, it conforms to
the Restatement's formulation and significantly limits the doctrine.
The third category is the most intriguing of all, as it apparently embodies
the original Keeton formulation, which would indicate that the Arizona Su-
preme Court views the Keeton principle as being different from the section 211
principle. To be included in the third category, there must be evidence beyond
the insured's belief that coverage has been afforded. This evidence must show
that the insurer, or someone authorized to act on its behalf, has engaged in
some activity that would lead a reasonable person in the insured's position to
expect coverage. Although the expectation must be reasonable when judged in
an objectively determinable manner, there are numerous possible situations that
would be included in this category. For example, application of the doctrine
does not require consideration from an insurer perspective and, moreover, appli-
cation is not limited to situations where coverage otherwise exists under the
policy. It could include situations where a policy provides no coverage for the
particular risk, but "some activity" of the insurer fosters a reasonable expecta-
tion of coverage. It also could include situations where the expectation is fos-
tered during, or even at the cessation of, the contract period. The expectation
would not have to arise at the inception of the contract. Finally, the proper
division of function between the judge and jury is not addressed in the setting of
the third category. All in all, the third category provides open-ended opportuni-
ties for the court to apply the doctrine to new situations. It may prove to be the
vehicle by which the Arizona Supreme Court will recognize that the doctrine of
reasonable expectations is neither synonymous with nor limited by the formula-
tion in section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
It has taken several decades for the principle of reasonable expectations to
evolve into a doctrine and only in the last two decades has the doctrinal content
really been refined into a core set of rules. These rules are embodied in section
211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. However, both Iowa and Ari-
zona already appear to have moved beyond the Restatement requirement that
the reasonableness of the insured's expectations must be determined from what
the insurer had reason to believe about those expectations. Perhaps Arizona, by
recognizing the Keeton formulation as establishing an independent category of
situations where the doctrine should apply, has moved even further beyond the
limits of the Restatement. Therefore, the adoption of section 211 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts by the Iowa and Arizona courts as the foundation
of the doctrine of reasonable expectations appears to provide for healthy devel-
opment, rather than for a static rule. Although an important touchstone has
been provided for the application of the doctrine, the Iowa and Arizona opinions
do not purport to establish the outer boundaries of application. The doctrine
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still seems to be evolving. Perhaps the last decade of this century will reveal new
insights into the applicability of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The last two decades have witnessed the birth of a principle and its matu-
ration into a body of law that accommodates competing interests of parties to
standardized agreements. The standard form contract is a necessity in today's
society, but there is a special need for an exception to the wholesale enforce-
ment of such documents. This need is particularly acute in those situations
where public policy requires that the costs of serious accidents and sickness be
transferred and distributed over large numbers of people to prevent too severe
an impact on any one individual or entity. This transfer and redistribution of
accident and sickness costs is the business of insurance, and standard forms are
necessary to the success of that business. However, a necessary element of the
distribution of these costs is that the system operate in a fair and equitable
manner. No insurance system can be fair and equitable where would-be in-
sureds are deprived of the opportunity to participate intelligently in the system
because of some obfuscating factor that is beyond their control. The principle of
reasonable expectations emerged in recognition of the need to eliminate these
barriers to intelligent participation. It has evolved over the past two decades
into a doctrine that balances the needs of insureds against those of insurers, as
it continues to further the overriding goal of fair and equitable allocation of
costs of accidents and sickness in this society. Although it has matured in many
respects, it appears that it has not stopped growing, nor should it.
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